Dwayne | Reading desk

Chatham House30 SeptArticle

Trump, midterms and the Middle East: What comes next?

Trump, midterms and the Middle East: What comes next? 13 October 2026 — 16:00 TO 17:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 30 September 2026 Online As the midterms approach, hear from a panel of experts on how domestic politics are shaping US policy in the Middle East. As the midterms approach, hear from leading policymakers and analysts on how domestic politics are shaping US policy in the Middle East. The Trump administration enters the midterm election season facing major challenges across the Middle East, from regional conflicts and great-power competition to questions over the future of US engagement. Domestic political pressures are increasingly shaping policy choices. These dynamics will have significant implications for America’s role in the region and its relationships with allies and adversaries. This event discusses: How are the midterm elections shaping US policy in the Middle East? What are President Trump’s main regional priorities? How could developments in the Middle East affect domestic politics in the United States? What role do Iran, Israel and the Gulf states play in Washington’s current strategy? How might US policy evolve after the elections? What do current trends mean for the future of US engagement in the region?

Anonymous

Chatham House30 SeptArticle

Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like?

Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like? Expert comment jon.wallace 30 September 2026 A detailed, reciprocal, and verifiable process is essential to ensure that any agreement holds. The war between the United States and Iran has entered an uncertain phase between escalation and diplomacy. At the UN General Assembly, Iran offered a proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume nuclear talks – if various conditions were met. That has apparently been rejected by President Donald Trump. Subsequent reports claimed the president was considering new strikes on Iran. Meanwhile, attacks on ships from the Iran-backed Houthis have extended the conflict into the Red Sea. Given the scope of disagreement between Washington and Tehran, and the global impact of the Strait’s prolonged closure, any settlement will likely need to begin with an unwinding of the Hormuz situation. Can that be achieved? It is possible. But a successful agreement on Hormuz requires above all a technically precise, reciprocal, and verifiable process that focuses on restoring freedom of navigation. It is unlikely to be effectively addressed through another vague Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or as part of a wider grand bargain. Status of the Strait Tehran has enforced its declared ‘closure’ of the Strait of Hormuz by demanding that ships transit through Iranian waters, charging tolls, and striking vessels it claims have violated its policies. This has resulted in 85 maritime incidents and 24 seafarer deaths reported across the Gulf region. The US has responded by i

jon.wallace

Chatham House29 SeptArticle

What are financial markets telling us?

What are financial markets telling us? 7 October 2026 — 18:00 TO 19:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 29 September 2026 Chatham House and Online Learn how geopolitics, inflation, AI and fiscal policy are converging to reshape borrowing costs. Learn how geopolitics, inflation, AI and fiscal policy are converging to reshape borrowing costs. Global bond yields have risen sharply this year thanks to a variety of forces, including war-fuelled inflation, AI-driven growth, loose fiscal policy and geopolitical risk. Recent interventions have struggled to contain market pressure, sharpening questions about where we may be headed. Is a new financial crisis possible? This event discusses: What are rising yields signalling about inflation, global growth and government debt burdens? Why have recent interventions struggled to contain pressure in bond markets? How is conflict in the Middle East affecting inflation expectations and borrowing costs? What does AI-driven economic activity mean for interest rates and asset prices? How are loose fiscal policies changing sovereign debt risks? Could weaker demand for AI compute trigger a wider market correction?

Anonymous

Chatham House28 SeptArticle

What does Brazil's 2026 election mean for its foreign policy and democracy?

What does Brazil's 2026 election mean for its foreign policy and democracy? 22 October 2026 — 17:00 TO 18:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 28 September 2026 Online Brazil’s 2026 election pits competing visions of democracy, economic policy, security and foreign policy against deep voter distrust. Experts unpack the results of Brazil’s 4 October election and discuss what Brazil’s election mean for democracy, foreign policy, climate change, multilateralism and geopolitics. Experts unpack the results so far, and discuss what they mean for democracy, foreign policy, climate change, multilateralism and geopolitics. At stake are the future of relations with Washington and Beijing, support for the BRICS and other multilateral organizations, and the response to domestic insecurity. This event discusses: Which issues and voter concerns are shaping Brazil’s 2026 election? How could the result affect trust in elections and democratic institutions? What do divisions over foreign policy – including climate change and the BRICS – mean for Brazil’s foreign policy? How could relations with the US and China change after the election? What would the result mean for economic policy, trade and investor confidence?

Anonymous

Chatham House28 SeptArticle

US midterms polls: Are Democrats winning or is Trump losing?

US midterms polls: Are Democrats winning or is Trump losing? Expert comment thilton.drupal 28 September 2026 Polls suggest Democrats will take control of the House of Representatives as American voters are dissatisfied with President Trump and his policies. Americans go to the polls on 3 November to elect a third of the US Senate and all the House of Representatives. The Republicans currently have majorities in both chambers of Congress. But their prospects of retaining this control look increasingly dire. The Republicans’ chances have been dragged down by President Donald Trump’s near-record low public approval rating and voter dissatisfaction with his handling of the Iran war and the economy, among other things. Democrats appear poised to take advantage, with most pundits suggesting they will retake control of at least the House of Representatives. But the race is not over yet. In the end, the key factor will likely be turnout, which is historically lower in midterms than presidential elections. Whichever party better mobilizes their voters to turn up on election day will ultimately determine the outcome. Democrats are strong favourites At this point, this election is the Democratic Party’s to lose. Republicans currently hold a narrow majority in the 435-seat House of Representatives. To control the House, which gives a party the ability to name chairmen of committees and set the legislative agenda, the Democrats will need to win at least 218 seats. They currently have 212 seats. Due to polarization and redistricting, most seats are highly unlikely to change party. Electi

thilton.drupal

Chatham House28 SeptArticle

Israel’s election: What will it mean for neighbours and allies?

Israel’s election: What will it mean for neighbours and allies? 8 October 2026 — 17:00 TO 18:15 BST Anonymous (not verified) 28 September 2026 Chatham House and Online Hear from experts on the foreign policy choices facing Israel’s next government. Hear from experts on the foreign policy choices facing Israel’s next government. Israel’s upcoming election follows three years of war and a marked decline in international support. Leading candidates to be prime minister offer little in terms of rethinking Israeli foreign policy and all reject Palestinian statehood. The election outcome could have profound consequences for the Palestinians and Israel’s relations with neighbouring states and international partners. This event discusses: What is at stake for Palestinians and regional states in Israel’s election? Would a change of government alter relations with the UK, US and Europe? How do leading candidates view relations with Lebanon, Syria and Turkey? How might Israel’s next government approach Iran? Could a new government change Israel’s approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict? Can Israel’s next government rebuild international public support?

Anonymous

Chatham House28 SeptArticle

Brazil’s presidential election is more than just another polarized contest

Brazil’s presidential election is more than just another polarized contest Expert comment jon.wallace 28 September 2026 A Bolsonaro victory would mean Trump-aligned governments dominate South America. The first round of Brazil’s presidential election is scheduled for 4 October, with 13 candidates competing to occupy the Brazilian presidential palace, Planalto. For now, the contest is dominated by two men. Only a few percentage points (depending on the poll) separate 80-year-old President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) – running for his fourth term – and 45-year-old Flávio Bolsonaro of the right-wing Liberal Party (PL). Flávio is the son of the man Lula defeated in 2022, former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019–23), sometimes referred to as the ‘Trump of the tropics’. Lula squeaked out a narrow victory in the 2022 contest, of 50.9 to 49.1 percent in the second round, after public opinion surveys had seriously undercounted the support of his right-wing rival. Jair Bolsonaro is currently serving time for plotting a coup , after his supporters rioted in Brasilia in 2023 in an effort to overturn the 2022 results. This year’s contest is more than a familial grudge match. For one, it looks a lot like recent presidential elections in the region. In June, elections in both Peru and Colombia went to a second round. Each resulted in a narrow victory for conservative candidates who, like the Bolsonaros, are aligned with the regional diplomatic agenda of US President Donald Trump. Another tight contest now looms in Brazil, the most populous country and largest democra

jon.wallace

Chatham House25 SeptArticle

The Climate Briefing: Contested waters in international politics

The Climate Briefing: Contested waters in international politics Audio thilton.drupal 25 September 2026 Climate change, rising demand, and geopolitical rivalry are reshaping the politics of water. Bhargabi, Beatrice, and their guests discuss what’s at stake for cooperation on shared water resources. This season of droughts, heatwaves, and wildfires has shone a light on a growing vulnerability: the security of our water resources. Following the Stockholm World Water Week that took place last month and an upcoming UN Water Conference in Abu Dhabi later this year, this episode explores questions around how climate change and growing demand are reshaping global water security. It considers: Where is water becoming a source or a tool of geopolitical tension? Is the international system equipped to manage these pressures? What can be done about it? To find out, Bhargabi and Beatrice Mosello speak to Susanne Schmeier, Professor of Water Cooperation, Law and Diplomacy at IHE Delft and Utrecht University, and David Michel, Senior Associate (non-resident) at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Read more expert commentary on this topic here: The world is far off meeting its growing water needs. Can the UN still lead the response? India and Pakistan still cannot agree to restore the Indus Waters Treaty – but re-engagement could help bring lasting peace Europe’s summer of fires: Burnham must centre climate adaptation in policies About The Climate Briefing The Climate Briefing explores key themes in the UN climate negotiations and international climate politics. The podca

thilton.drupal

Chatham House25 SeptArticle

New energy and trade routes could bypass Hormuz and change the Middle East. But major challenges remain

New energy and trade routes could bypass Hormuz and change the Middle East. But major challenges remain Expert comment thilton.drupal 25 September 2026 The Strait of Hormuz crisis is accelerating a wider reordering of the region, as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon plan new oil pipelines and transport corridors. But whether they can seize the opportunity to diversify will ultimately depend on wider reforms. The war on Iran and the resulting disruption to the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the vulnerability of existing trade and energy routes and unsettled the old balance of power across the Middle East. In this context, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are seeking to capitalize on their position between Europe and the Gulf and improve their connectivity via oil and gas pipelines, roads, railways and digital corridors. Once central to an Iranian regional order, all three governments are now aiming to achieve greater sovereignty by diversifying their economic ties, a shift supported by the Trump administration. Yet they are attempting to do so while facing foreign occupations and military action, and while also confronting domestic endemic corruption and fragmented political systems that empower armed groups. Whether they can seize this opportunity to become more connected – and more sovereign – will therefore depend not only on the infrastructure they build, but on whether they can reform their states to govern it. Changing energy routes The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused severe disruption to regional energy flows, including from Iraq. Pre-war, Iraq was exporting around 3.

thilton.drupal

Chatham House25 SeptArticle

China rising, America in decline? The Trump-Xi summit

China rising, America in decline? The Trump-Xi summit Audio sseth.drupal@c… 25 September 2026 In this week’s episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss the Trump-Xi summit in Washington and the increasing competition between the two superpowers. President Donald Trump welcomes Xi Jinping to Washington with the US-China dynamic in a moment of historic flux. China is rising economically and militarily, while the US is mired in the Iran war, alienating allies and pursuing Trump’s unpredictable trade and tariff disputes. What do the two leaders want from this meeting, and will they get it? Can they reconcile their differing economic powers, the competition for critical minerals, and their radically contrasting visions for artificial intelligence. And in the longer term: who will dominate the 21st century? Does Xi really want to retake Taiwan for China before his time in power ends? Or is the US-Chinese dynamic more complex and perhaps less alarming? To unpick these threads Bronwen Maddox is joined by three experts from Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific Programme: programme director Ben Bland, senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie and associate fellow Dr Bill Hayton. About Independent Thinking Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues. More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts and Spotify . Explore our other Chatham House podcasts .

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Chatham House24 SeptArticle

What can DRC’s national dialogue achieve?

What can DRC’s national dialogue achieve? Expert comment jon.wallace 24 September 2026 President Tshisekedi and the opposition both want national dialogue. But it remains to be seen whether they can agree on the nature of the DRC’s problems, let alone their solutions. When President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Félix Tshisekedi finally announced a ‘national dialogue’ on 27 August, he evoked the country’s long history of previous negotiations. Too often, he said, they had been about elite power sharing, had not meaningfully included the Congolese people, and had legitimized armed insurrection. This time will be different, he promised. Tshisekedi appealed directly to the Congolese people by proposing a series of public consultations in all 26 provinces, culminating in a convention in Kinshasa. Unlike previous dialogues, this process has a more ambitious aim. It not only seeks to address the causes of insecurity and inequality in DRC and identify reforms. It also seeks to reconstruct or re-found the state. The opposition immediately denounced the project. The C64, a coalition made up of opposition heavyweights including Moïse Katumbi, Martin Fayulu, Delly Sesanga and Jean-Marc Kabund, rejected Tshisekedi’s proposal . So too did the ‘Sauvons le Congo’ platform created by exiled former president Joseph Kabila. Tshisekedi’s plan, they claim, is intended above all to legitimize his attempt to change the constitution, possibly allowing the president to extend his rule beyond his two-term limit, which ends in 2028. They point to a controversial bill that would pave

jon.wallace

Chatham House24 SeptArticle

Palestine, Jordan and Egypt ambassadors: On the future of Palestine

Palestine, Jordan and Egypt ambassadors: On the future of Palestine 5 October 2026 — 13:30 TO 14:45 BST Anonymous (not verified) 24 September 2026 Chatham House Join this fascinating discussion as three Middle East ambassadors to the UK discuss reconstruction, security, President Trump’s Board of Peace, and more. Join this fascinating discussion as three Mideast ambassadors to the UK discuss reconstruction, security, President Trump’s Board of Peace, and more. In August 2026, eight Arab and Islamic countries issued a statement reiterating their support for an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. The group condemned Israeli measures aimed at displacing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, as well as Israel’s continued resistance to implementing President Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza. This event will bring together ambassadors from states in the Middle East to discuss developments in Palestine. They will also talk about the role of regional states – and the UK - in furthering dialogue, peace and reconstruction. This event discusses: How are Arab states supporting peace, security, and reconstruction in Palestine? What are the immediate and medium-term priorities? What are states’ perspectives towards the Board of Peace, and President Trump’s Peace Plan? What are key takeaways from UNGA concerning regional and global actors’ positions towards Israel and Palestine? Where do opportunities lie for achieving long-term peace? What role do external actors, including the UK and EU, have in supporting Palestine’s future? There will be a 30-minute coffee reception following the

Anonymous

Chatham House24 SeptArticle

Denmark’s Greenland deal with Trump is a victory for diplomacy over bullying

Denmark’s Greenland deal with Trump is a victory for diplomacy over bullying Expert comment jon.wallace 24 September 2026 Denmark used its soft power to rally support and took the dispute out of the limelight – addressing underlying US interests instead of President Trump’s unacceptable public position. This week, Denmark has extricated itself from a period of coercive US diplomacy over Greenland. The agreement announced on 22 September elegantly resolves the dispute over the territory, without forcing Denmark or the government of Greenland to give up very much. Even before the dispute, Denmark had indicated it would be content to increase the number of US bases in Greenland and enhance US access to them. These measures were already possible under an existing 1951 agreement. The new agreement adds an undertaking by Denmark and Greenland to refuse major investments from non-members of the EU or NATO that would grant them a foothold in strategic Arctic areas. Again, on this point, Washington was pushing on an open door. The only meaningful change concerns the mechanism to ensure that this arrangement will be permanent. The 1951 agreement, amended in 2004, also does not expire. But the new text adds that Greenland will remain part of NATO and continue to comply with the agreement, should it opt for independence. An independent Greenland might have been willing to retain the US bases and related agreements anyway. After all, it would need to rely on US defence support and a NATO security guarantee. But expressly making these points in an agreement co-signed by Greenland overcam

jon.wallace

Chatham House22 SeptArticle

Trump–Xi summit: Why the US and China should not underestimate each other

Trump–Xi summit: Why the US and China should not underestimate each other Expert comment LToremark 22 September 2026 The US and China both face serious domestic strains. As Trump and Xi meet this week to discuss trade, AI and Taiwan, neither side should mistake the other’s weaknesses for strategic decline. A superpower summit is a big deal. As US President Donald Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping meet in Washington this week, they have a lot to cover. They will try to extend a trade truce that expires in November, including China’s pause on rare earth export controls and America’s delay on chip restrictions. The leaders will also tackle Taiwan, where Beijing wants Washington to halt a $14 billion arms package, as well as China’s purchases of Iranian oil and a proposed dialogue on the national security risks of artificial intelligence (AI). In their negotiations, each side may be tempted to focus on the other’s weaknesses. But underestimating the other’s power would be unwise. China has many weaknesses – but should not be underestimated Many observers argue that China’s economic vulnerabilities will limit its international ambitions. Its growth model is faltering; its households still are not spending, so Beijing continues to push surplus production overseas. This has provoked a backlash of trade barriers from the US, EU and beyond. The property sector – once a quarter of the economy – is in its fifth year of slump, while a mountain of hidden local government debt threatens to drag down China’s growth for years to come. Meanwhile Xi’s government has become steadily more

LToremark

Chatham House21 SeptArticle

Can Gulf Arab countries help break the deadlock over Trump’s Gaza peace plan?

Can Gulf Arab countries help break the deadlock over Trump’s Gaza peace plan? Expert comment LToremark 21 September 2026 Gulf Arab states increasingly view Israel as the main obstacle to progress on the peace plan – and may hope for an opening after Israel’s October elections. Almost a year after US President Donald Trump unveiled his 20-point peace plan for Gaza, which was adopted by both Israel and Hamas and paved the way for the release of all Israeli hostages, the peace process appears to have hit a wall. The two sides remain fundamentally divided over the sequencing of demilitarization and Israeli withdrawal. So far, Hamas has refused to give up its heavy weapons unless Israel halts all military operations and withdraws its forces from the parts of Gaza it currently controls – approximately 60 per cent of the strip – while Israel says it will not withdraw until Hamas disarms. Although President Trump continues to argue that the situation in Gaza is under control, his envoy Jared Kushner, who recently visited Israel, and the director-general of his Board of Peace, Nikolay Mladenov, have so far been unable to launch the second phase of the process. Related work The Iran war has left Gaza neglected In September, Kushner acknowledged that the task of demilitarizing Gaza was proving far more difficult than initially expected: ‘We are starting to understand the scope of the militarization of Gaza. It is beyond your comprehension’. In August, he had told Fox News that he expected Hamas to begin handing over its weapons in ‘ as few as 30 days ’. Meanwhile, the humanitarian sit

LToremark

Chatham House21 SeptArticle

Chatham House fellow gives evidence at UK parliament committee on global AI governance and risks

Chatham House fellow gives evidence at UK parliament committee on global AI governance and risks News release thilton.drupal 21 September 2026 Senior Research Fellow Isabella Wilkinson spoke to the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee at a time when many are calling for greater regulation of AI in the light of emerging risks. Isabella Wilkinson, Senior Research Fellow with Chatham House’s Digital Society Programme, gave evidence on the global governance of AI to the UK House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee on 16 September. Wilkinson outlined the main types of risk from AI: malicious risks, loss-of-control risks and systemic risks. Addressing the governance challenge posed by these risks, she said: ‘We’re facing a governance challenge because all of these risks are interlinked, so we have to be very strategic about how we design governance at multiple different levels. This is a multilateral challenge.’ Wilkinson said that interlinked governance challenges, including a dearth of trusted information about AI and ‘the lack of a crisis toolbox’ to deploy in the event of a crisis, had led to ‘quite a severe state of gridlock in multilateral AI governance.’ The committee was meeting in a week in which debates over the risks associated with AI featured prominently in public debate, following calls by tech leaders to slow the pace of the technology’s development. ‘We are in a moment of intense crisis and turbulence in multilateral AI governance. But as we’ve learned [from other areas of governance] … these conditions create a window of

thilton.drupal

Chatham House18 SeptArticle

The Director's Annual Lecture 2027

The Director's Annual Lecture 2027 12 January 2027 — 18:00 TO 19:00 GMT Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2026 Chatham House and Online Join Chatham House Director and Chief Executive Bronwen Maddox for the 2027 Director’s Annual Lecture. Join Chatham House Director and Chief Executive Bronwen Maddox for the 2027 Director’s Annual Lecture. Bronwen Maddox, Director and Chief Executive at Chatham House, delivers her annual lecture.

Anonymous

Chatham House18 SeptArticle

‘Coupling without fusion’: Canada and Europe test a new kind of alliance

‘Coupling without fusion’: Canada and Europe test a new kind of alliance Expert comment jon.wallace 18 September 2026 The deeper relationship proposed by Carney and von der Leyen could send a powerful geopolitical message. But can agreement be reached without antagonizing EU candidate countries? There is something rather extraordinary about the geopolitical times we live in. They are making what seemed impossible yesterday possible today, and what once sounded laughable increasingly credible. This week’s proposals for closer integration between Canada and the EU undoubtedly belongs to that category. On 16 September, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen proposed making Canada the EU’s first ‘associate member’. The next day, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney used his address to the European Parliament to set out an unusually ambitious programme of economic and strategic integration. Canada and Europe, he argued , should cooperate across critical minerals, defence production, artificial intelligence and computing, energy, space and payments. They should move towards ‘seamless’ digital trade in non-agricultural goods and services. And they should expand opportunities for young Canadians and Europeans to live, work and study across the Atlantic. Canada also eyes access to the EU’s Horizon research programme. If the concept of associate membership is yet to be properly defined – starting with meaningful legal substance – Carney’s address gave it discernible geopolitical purpose. His argument rests on a lesson he has repeated since his Davos speech in January 2026:

jon.wallace

Chatham House18 SeptArticle

Artificial Intelligence, Real Fears: Is it time to slow down?

Artificial Intelligence, Real Fears: Is it time to slow down? Audio sseth.drupal@c… 18 September 2026 On this week’s episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss the growing fears around the development of AI. A call by leaders of the tech giants on the frontier of Artificial Intelligence to ‘slow the pace’ of its development has sparked debate over the risks associated with AI. Does AI represent an existential threat, and if so, how urgent are the warnings? Or can humanity harness this powerful technology to our benefit? Our experts discuss the implications for international security, from cyber to the increasing use of AI in today’s conflict zones, and the dynamics of the race toward the cutting edge – not only among industry competitors, but also in the realm of geopolitics. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Dr Marion Messmer, director of our International Security Programme, and Alex Krasodomski, director of our Digital Society Programme. About Independent Thinking Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues. More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts and Spotify . Explore our other Chatham House podcasts .

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Chatham House17 SeptArticle

Chatham House welcomes 2026 interns

Chatham House welcomes 2026 interns News release jon.wallace 17 September 2026 Our internships offers an invaluable learning experience through a six-month placement. Chatham House is excited to welcome the 2026-2027 cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme. Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability. The internships grant practical learning opportunities at a world-famous think-tank, helping a new generation of policymakers understand how to shape policy, influence debate and create meaningful change towards a sustainable future. This autumn, Chatham House staff in seven departments are delighted to welcome interns to their teams: Arumina Hull, Environment and Society Centre Claire Ellis, Events team Daria Svitlyk, Europe, Russia and Eurasia Programmes Leila Hopkins Ait Bamai, UK in the World & US and North America Programmes Nour Al-Amoudi, Middle East and North Africa Programme Oluwadara Osinowo, Africa Programme Shehab Khashoggi, Middle East and North Africa Programme For more information about the internships, please contact the Academy team .

jon.wallace