When NATO members gather in Ankara on July 7th-8th, they will do so with fresh warnings about Russian plans for a “provocation” ringing in their ears. Ukraine’s strikes deep inside Russia are teaching Vladimir Putin the painful lesson that high-intensity war involving a nuclear-armed state can take place below the nuclear threshold. As Putin tries to reassert some deterrence, European leaders must not repeat his mistake and assume their territory is safe from hybrid or conventional attack by virtue of NATO’s nuclear guarantees.
To credibly deter the continuum of Russian threats, Europe must update its approach to deterrence. It should do so by building up its conventional capabilities to combine with the French and British nuclear doctrines, and the US umbrella. This would have the added benefit of spreading responsibility for deterrence across the European continent and the Atlantic, thereby signalling to America that it is not the only thing standing between Europe and a Russian attack.
Forward deterrence
In March, France’s president Emmanuel Macron gave a speech on the country’s nuclear posture that elicited a lot of interest across Europe. The “forward deterrence” he mentioned in the speech would involve France deploying nuclear bombs elsewhere on the continent following consultations with European partners. Coming from a country that refuses to take part in the NATO nuclear planning group, such an opening is noteworthy.
But Macron also affirmed that France continues to reject any “tactical” use of nuclear weapons, for which its nuclear arsenal is totally inadequate. France’s smaller nuclear weapons are not rungs in a long ladder of escalation. They are merely meant as a last warning to demonstrate French determination and willingness to cross the nuclear threshold before the launch of strategic strikes. French leaders have also repeatedly stressed that their willingness to discuss nuclear issues with European partners is in no way an attempt to accelerate “strategic autonomy” by replacing the American nuclear umbrella. France has neither the capabilities nor the doctrine to do that.
Indeed, it would be counter-productive to repeat at the European level the debate on extended deterrence that took place in the 1970s between Europeans and Americans, especially at a time when the politics of Europe must contend with a resurgence of nationalism. Although France, contrary to the US, is directly affected by any conflict on the European continent, it remains implausible that if a Baltic state were overrun by a conventional Russian force, a French president would be the first to cross the nuclear threshold. This implausibility, however, will likely not stop attempts by extreme-right parties to paint the realities of forward deterrence differently.
Moreover, forward deterrence makes the crucial political point that French vital interests are broader than French territory. Yet it remains difficult to see what the idea would change in practice besides political signalling, as useful as that signalling may be. It would thus be unfortunate if the idea of French forward deterrence became another way for Europeans not to think about the realities of war, in the same way that over-reliance on the American nuclear umbrella has smothered strategic thinking in Europe.
Thresholds of deterrence
A second observation in Macron’s speech may trigger a more productive debate. The French president noted that, in recent months, waves of missiles have fallen on nuclear-armed states (Russia and Israel) and that the same thing could happen in Europe. With this observation, he made clear that nuclear deterrence does not preclude major war and that over-reliance on it is dangerous.
Western powers were right to prove Russia wrong in its belief that it could launch an aggression against a neighbour while sanctuarising its own territory by the mere fact of being a nuclear power. But Vladimir Putin now aims to prove Ukraine’s Western partners wrong in their belief that they remain safe behind the protection of NATO. From Putin’s perspective, it is right to ask why, if the battlefield of Ukraine expands to Russia, would the countries that support Ukraine remain untouched? The fact that one side has violated international law while the other tries to uphold it is irrelevant from a military standpoint.
At some point in the next year, if the situation continues to deteriorate for Russia, its leaders may thus try to show the friends of Ukraine that their support is not risk-free. One may dismiss the bluster of Russian strategist Sergey Karaganov or former president Dmitry Medvedev, with their threats of nuclear strikes against European countries. But short of that, and short of a land incursion into NATO territory, Russia still has plenty of options at its disposal. As Latvia’s intelligence service pointed out at the end of June, Russia is considering “hybrid attacks, such as missiles, drones or other actions designed to send a signal: stop supporting Ukraine, or you will have your own problems.” So, Europeans need an updated strategy that can credibly deter such a range of aggression.
A continuum of deterrence
Here, too, the Ukraine war provides some lessons. It is rumoured that when Russia was failing in Ukraine in late 2022, America not only asked China to weigh in to stop Putin from crossing the nuclear threshold, but also conveyed the message that the American response to crossing the nuclear threshold would be devastating conventional strikes against Russian strategic assets. This was a much more credible threat by the US than the threat of a nuclear strike.
Europeans should draw some broader lessons from that dangerous episode, which may help make the continent’s strategy more cohesive. Deterrence is not about a division of roles in which conventional forces on the front line act as a tripwire, while nuclear powers are the only true deterrent. The European deterrence of the future should thus combine conventional deterrence through long-range strike capabilities with the nuclear deterrence essential to prevent Russian nuclear blackmail and escalation dominance.
That comprehensive doctrine will require an in-depth discussion between Europeans and with America. Britain and France, just like the US, will not want to be trapped into a nuclear escalation because a non-nuclear power has launched an uncoordinated long-range conventional strategic strike against Russia. At the same time, non-nuclear powers want a better understanding of how nuclear powers see the escalation ladder. Coordination on deterrence would thus help European countries develop a shared understanding of risk and what strikes Russia might absorb without triggering a nuclear response. European coordination with America would signal that the latter’s nuclear umbrella is not the only thing guarding Europe against a Russian attack.
The result should be a more inclusive vision of deterrence. This would help ensure all major European military powers have a shared responsibility in deterring aggression. It would bring political benefits too, by allowing for a much healthier discussion between Europeans that does not pit non-nuclear powers against nuclear ones. In that new context, the most effective way to strengthen European deterrence may involve working to accelerate and possibly consolidate the various European programmes to develop European long-range strike capabilities.