For some time after October 2025, it seemed that the long diplomatic stalemate over Western Sahara might have been broken. This desert territory is claimed by Morocco but sought by the Algeria-based Polisario Front as the home of an independent state for the Sahrawi people. A UN Security Council resolution passed in October 2025 strengthened international backing for a Moroccan autonomy proposal while remaining vague enough to allow for the possibility of other outcomes. Working together with the UN envoy to Western Sahara, Washington used this narrow opening to bring Morocco and the Polisario back into direct discussions for the first time since 2019. Algeria and Mauritania, both neighbours of Western Sahara, also joined. Three rounds of talks in Washington and Madrid allowed the parties to explore practical elements of a possible settlement without forcing either Morocco or the Polisario to abandon its stance on Western Sahara’s sovereignty, autonomy and self-determination.
But the opening is now in danger of closing. The U.S. and UN tried to move too fast, from exploratory discussions to negotiations centred on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, meeting with firm resistance from the Polisario, which insists on a self-determination vote. Meanwhile, a series of diplomatic and military incidents sullied what had been a constructive atmosphere. Washington has responded by applying increasing pressure on the Front, entertaining alternative Sahrawi interlocutors and considering changes to the diplomatic framework. Uncertainty about the U.S. position on the future of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) adds another complication.
The U.S. concededly has a difficult diplomatic task. It needs to show both resolve and a capacity for patience if it wants to coax the parties toward progress – and right now the balance is off. Why the U.S. decided to become so seized of this issue is unclear, but if the objective is a quick diplomatic win, then it is looking at the wrong file. Indeed, there is a significant risk that, if the administration persists in trying to force a quick settlement, it will risk deepening the mistrust that has long impeded progress in negotiations. Rather than searching for shortcuts, the U.S. and UN should seek to rebuild confidence among the parties, preserve an open negotiating framework and gradually create the political conditions under which substantive compromises might eventually become possible.
Creating Space for Talks
The Western Sahara conflict dates to 1975, when Spain withdrew from the territory and Morocco and Mauritania moved to divide it between them. The Polisario Front, backed principally by Algeria, launched an armed struggle for independence. Thousands of Sahrawis fled to Algeria. A UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991 envisaged a referendum on self-determination, but disagreements over who should be able to vote have prevented it from taking place. Morocco has instead promoted a plan that would devolve powers to an autonomous Western Sahara under Rabat’s sovereignty, while the Polisario continues to demand a route to independence. The ceasefire collapsed in 2020, though fighting has remained limited. That same year, during President Donald Trump’s first term, the U.S. recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, in exchange for Morocco’s normalisation of relations with Israel; during Trump’s second term, the administration has strongly endorsed Rabat’s autonomy plan.
In October 2025, the UN Security Council agreed to renew MINURSO’s mandate for another year, with new language more explicitly supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan. As the penholder, the U.S. had tabled a first draft that called autonomy “the basis” for future negotiations and “the most feasible solution”; but consultations among Council members led to watered-down language. The final version’s ambiguously (and awkwardly) worded text says autonomy will be taken “as basis” for negotiations and represents “a most feasible solution”. The Council thus gave its strong backing for the autonomy plan, while leaving the door ajar for discussion of other proposals.
While both the Polisario and Algeria said the resolution’s final version improved upon the first draft, they rejected it.
While both the Polisario and Algeria said the resolution’s final version improved upon the first draft, they rejected it. The former reiterated its demand for a self-determination referendum to settle the conflict, while the latter – then an elected member of the Council – took the politically unsurprising but exceptionally rare step of not voting on the resolution to register its opposition to a reference to “Moroccan sovereignty” in one of its preambular clauses.
Nonetheless, U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos used the resolution’s ambiguity to press Algeria and the Polisario to return to negotiations. In the weeks after the Council vote, Boulos signalled to both actors that, though Washington clearly supported autonomy, the UN resolution did not preclude another solution if the conflict parties agreed to it. At the time, a Polisario official told Crisis Group that “Boulos’s language is more neutral than the UN Security Council resolution” – an expression of growing confidence in Washington’s role. Between January and February 2026, ministerial-level delegations from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and the Polisario gathered twice in Washington and once in Madrid, the first direct meetings between the conflict parties in seven years. The co-chairs were Boulos, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Michael Waltz and UN envoy Staffan de Mistura.
These rounds differed from previous efforts in at least three ways. First, Washington was directly involved in the discussions, marking a break from its traditional role as the UN envoy’s external supporter, with U.S. officials both driving the conversation and giving de Mistura space to help do the same. Secondly, Algeria and Mauritania participated in the talks – though only as ostensible “observers”. For years, Rabat has wanted Algiers and Nouakchott involved in negotiations, claiming that the Polisario is an Algerian proxy and that, to be durable, any agreement will have to be part of a grand bargain with countries abutting Western Sahara. Algeria and Mauritania have countered that they are merely neighbours interested in the conflict’s resolution (hence their insistence on “observer” status). Thirdly, ahead of the talks and responding to a demand repeatedly put forward by the U.S. and its European partners over the years, Morocco expanded its four-page autonomy proposal floated in 2007 into a comprehensive 40-page blueprint to guide negotiations.
The co-chairs insisted on confidentiality from the participants to protect discussions from political pressures at home. Though news broke that the four parties were talking, the contents of the three rounds have remained mostly secret, with Morocco’s expanded autonomy plan still under wraps. That said, diplomatic sources have told Crisis Group that the talks, which apparently touched upon organising elections and reintegrating Sahrawi refugees, among other things, went well overall. In a conversation with Crisis Group, a Polisario official was keen to stress that these exchanges were “a discussion, not a negotiation”. The open-ended format seemed to suit both sides, making it possible for them to re-engage with each other, however warily.
From Progress to Stalemate
The talks subsequently hit a wall, however. After the three meetings, the U.S. and UN repeatedly asked the Front to offer its comments on Rabat’s plan with the aim of kickstarting a more substantive discussion of how to end the conflict. The Polisario baulked, with an official explaining to Crisis Group that the Front “has not accepted the Moroccan autonomy plan as the basis for negotiations and the UN Security Council does not require us to accept it”. While this position should not have been surprising – the talks gained momentum only because of the ambiguity that the U.S. had managed to create around this key issue – U.S. and UN diplomats seemed both frustrated and bewildered by the Front’s attitude. A U.S. official noted that “Algeria showed much more flexibility than the Polisario” by encouraging the Front to respond to Morocco’s autonomy plan, rather than rejecting the proposal out of hand.
Between May and June, relations between the parties – as well as between the U.S. and the Polisario – quickly deteriorated. On 5 May, after a long period of quiet, the Front fired rockets at the city of Smara, in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, wounding a civilian and damaging a number of buildings. The U.S., France and several other countries, along with the EU and UN, immediately condemned the attack, calling it an attempt to undermine negotiations. The next day, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco Duke Buchan III visited Dakhla, in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, reiterating the Trump administration’s recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty and criticising the Polisario. On 7 May, the Polisario issued a statement denouncing Buchan’s visit and justifying the Smara attack as legitimate resistance to colonialism.
Things took a turn for the worse after an exchange of letters between Ambassador Waltz and Polisario leaders failed to restore mutual confidence.
Things took a turn for the worse after an exchange of letters between Ambassador Waltz and Polisario leaders failed to restore mutual confidence. According to several U.S. and European diplomats, Waltz wrote to ask whether the Front’s leaders were still committed to a negotiated solution after Smara. The Polisario reportedly responded with a long missive about the dispute’s complexity that Washington saw as obfuscatory. At that point, a number of administration insiders turned against the group. Tensions escalated further when, on 7 June, Moroccan forces killed Lahbib Abdelaziz, son of former Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz and a potential future leader of the Front. His killing shocked pro-independence Sahrawis, who complained that (in contrast to the outcry that followed the Smara attack) there was precious little international condemnation. Then, on 8 June, Sahrawi activist Naama Asfari – who was arrested in 2010 in connection with protests at Gdeim Izik – began a hunger strike, which lasted 47 days and ended only after Rabat granted him a transfer to a jail closer to his family.
By late June, U.S. frustration with the Polisario had begun to show. On 30 June, Waltz met with a delegation of the Sahrawi Movement for Peace (MSP), founded in 2020 as a self-styled moderate alternative to the Polisario, expressing willingness to negotiate with Morocco over autonomy. Waltz praised the MSP as an organisation committed to “peace, compromise and a durable solution” that “the world should hear”. Another meeting between a U.S. embassy official and an MSP delegation followed on 28 July. With these steps, the U.S. was breaking with a well-established practice of recognising the Polisario as the representative of the Sahrawi people (even if there was some dispute over whether it should be considered the sole, exclusive representative) and raising the spectre that it might bypass the Front absent greater cooperation. The Front reacted dismissively. A Polisario official told Crisis Group that U.S. officials “should come on the ground and see who really represents the Sahrawis. The Polisario comes from the people and remains representative. The groups they want to promote are nothing”.
Summing up the U.S. approach, a Western diplomat told Crisis Group that Washington believes the Polisario’s choice is between “the hard way and the harder way”, meaning that continued resistance by the movement to engaging with Morocco’s plan will bring more adverse consequences upon it. In another sign of tougher steps to come, and in parallel to the talks, a group of U.S. members of Congress introduced two bills that would require the Secretary of State to designate the Polisario as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) due to its alleged links with Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah. For legal and political reasons, it is hard to imagine these bills passing into law and being enforced, and the administration has expressed no support for them. But the administration could be working with Congressional allies to signal what might come next should the impasse persist.
Searching for Alternatives
Faced with a diplomatic deadlock ahead of the expiry of MINURSO’s mandate at the end of October, U.S. officials have been weighing other options, including replacing the Polisario with more flexible Sahrawi representatives, such as the MSP, in the talks. A Western diplomat observed that Washington could use the mandate renewal to try including new language that creates space at the negotiating table for the MSP and others (eg, elected Sahrawi officials who reside in Morocco) – for instance by referring to “Sahrawi representatives” rather than “the Polisario Front” when describing the concerned parties.
That said, not all U.S. officials seem ready to drop the Front or give up on the current format. In a 25 September interview with France 24, Boulos stressed that the U.S. was still hoping the Polisario would engage in talks, praised Algeria’s stance and highlighted that more work was needed to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement. The pro-Polisario media welcomed these remarks. In his 28 September speech to the UN General Assembly, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reiterated his country’s rejection of any shortcut to a deal: “Algeria warns that any attempt to bypass this framework of reference or marginalise the holders of the inalienable right, the people of Western Sahara and their sole, legitimate representative, the Polisario Front, will not contribute to resolving the conflict; rather, it will further exacerbate tensions”.
Meanwhile, Morocco has been assiduously currying favour with the Trump administration, even if it has not openly backed the idea of opening negotiations to other Sahrawi groups. In July, King Mohamed VI announced that the Tiznit-Dakhla road connecting Morocco to Western Sahara would be renamed the Donald J. Trump Highway as “a personal expression of my high regard”. On 15 September, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar and U.S. Ambassador Waltz agreed in New York on upgrading Israel-Morocco relations by appointing ambassadors and working toward a series of economic agreements to be signed by year’s end. In their official statement, the three countries reaffirmed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and support for the autonomy plan. “The tripartite agreement with the U.S. and Israel is an essential part of Morocco’s approach to Western Sahara”, a Moroccan expert told Crisis Group. “The diplomatic upgrade is a gesture addressed to Washington, as we need the U.S. on our side ahead of the next Security Council meeting”. According to Moroccan and European sources, Rabat is hoping that the MINURSO renewal will, among other things, include clearer backing for the autonomy plan as “the only basis” for resolving the conflict.
MINURSO’s future remains up in the air.
At this stage, MINURSO’s future remains up in the air. In October 2025, Washington tried to shorten the mission’s mandate to three months, hoping that more frequent Security Council involvement might increase pressure on the parties to reach a deal, thus allowing MINURSO to wind down, in line with the U.S. agenda of reducing spending on peacekeeping missions. Eventually, the U.S. settled for a twelve-month renewal in parallel with a strategic review conducted by the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, in anticipation of U.S. requests to trim peacekeeping spending, MINURSO underwent cuts, removing 23 civilian posts, reducing flying hours and slashing its own budget by 11.5 per cent. In an April Senate hearing, Waltz mentioned MINURSO as a mission that – in the Trump administration’s eyes – has outlived its purpose. Several European diplomats told Crisis Group that they suspected Washington would once again push for a major cut in the mission’s expenses or (less likely) its termination during the next renewal debate.
MINURSO’s political mandate has changed beyond recognition since its inception, insofar as it presently plays only a marginal role in diplomacy. But European officials who spoke to Crisis Group share the conviction that its presence remains critical to avoiding escalation. In 2022, Morocco made clear that, should MINURSO withdraw from the UN buffer zone separating the territory held by Rabat from the Algerian and Mauritanian borders, the kingdom would occupy this strip of land. If that were to happen, the Polisario would likely attack Moroccan installations from Algeria or Mauritania, rather than using the buffer zone as its launchpad, as is now the case. In turn, Rabat might decide to pursue Polisario units into Algerian or Mauritanian territory, potentially dragging its neighbours into conflict.
Rebuilding Confidence among the Parties
With the October deadline for renewing the MINURSO mandate fast approaching, U.S. officials could be tempted to either strong-arm the Polisario into accepting Morocco’s autonomy plan or replace the Front with a more accommodating alternative. They may hope that this small organisation will eventually buckle under Washington’s pressure, fearful of the consequences of continued obduracy, which might range from being cast aside to being designated as an FTO, with the severe attendant sanctions. For an administration keen to secure quick deals to end wars, ending the Western Sahara conflict might look like low-hanging fruit.
Taking this tack would be highly risky. Since the breakdown of the UN-organised referendum scheme in the early 2000s and, in particular, the resumption of hostilities in 2020, confidence between Morocco and the Polisario has been running low, a by-product of the conflict’s five-decade duration, the accumulation of failed diplomatic initiatives, competing legal and historical narratives, and repeated periods of military confrontation and political deadlock. The two sides continue to approach negotiations from fundamentally different premises: Morocco sees autonomy under its sovereignty as the sole viable end state, while the Polisario insists on a process that preserves the option of independence. In addition, since the 2021 diplomatic rupture between Algeria and Morocco, the conflict has been nestled within a regional dispute, further complicating efforts to resolve it.
U.S. pressure alone is unlikely to yield a substantive breakthrough, certainly not without simultaneous confidence-building measures.
U.S. pressure alone is unlikely to yield a substantive breakthrough, certainly not without simultaneous confidence-building measures. The Polisario regards self-determination for all practical purposes as an existential issue, meaning that it is more likely to dig in than concede in the face of coercion, with much of the cost of any standoff being borne by vulnerable Sahrawi refugees. In such a scenario, the risk of escalatory violence would also increase. For leaders on both sides to make difficult concessions, and for public opinion to accept them, at least some preliminary steps are needed. Otherwise, both will view negotiations as a zero-sum game, dimming prospects for a resolution. “We need a minimum of trust”, a Polisario official commented to Crisis Group.
Against this backdrop, Washington should drop any illusion of reaching a swift deal. Instead, it ought to embrace a more patient approach that, for now, focuses on clearing the air among parties whose relations have soured. The co-chairs should look to four confidence-building measures that might create a better atmosphere for future talks. They should:
- First, press Morocco and the Polisario to allow Sahrawi families in Algerian refugee camps to visit Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, and vice versa, resuming a program that was suspended in 2014. These exchanges would create regular, low-risk cooperation among Morocco, Polisario and the UN in service of a concrete humanitarian need, while reconnecting people divided by the conflict and helping reduce both mistrust and the political cost of engagement;
- Secondly, urge Morocco to release some or all the Sahrawi prisoners it has held since the 2010 Gdeim Izik protests – or at least to honour prisoners’ requests for transfer to jails closer to their families;
- Thirdly, push the Polisario to declare a unilateral truce in return. Even though the Front rejects returning to the 1991 ceasefire, it might be persuaded to temporarily suspend its attacks to avoid undermining talks; and
- Finally, arrange for U.S. and UN officials to visit the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, meeting the Polisario leadership and holding town hall-style meetings with refugees to listen to their concerns.
The co-chairs also should revise their diplomatic approach to get out of the current cul-de-sac. Rather than pushing the Polisario to respond to Morocco’s autonomy plan – which it rejects as a sole basis for negotiations – they should revert to the format of the three rounds held in Washington and Madrid, thus creating space for the parties to continue a less structured exchange of views on their respective plans. The co-chairs could facilitate these conversations and advance bridging proposals on the specific issues discussed. The most difficult questions relating to sovereignty should be left for the end. Over time, such an approach – pursued on the basis that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” – might eventually allow for more in-depth discussions.
Algeria has made clear it would not participate in a dialogue that does not include the [Polisario] Front.
Crucially, the U.S. should stop suggesting it might replace the Polisario with other Sahrawi representatives in the talks. Algeria has made clear it would not participate in a dialogue that does not include the Front. Besides, any settlement reached with such alternative groups would almost certainly lack popular buy-in and would fuel tensions among Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania. That said, the co-chairs might create a purely consultative parallel track bringing together other Sahrawis, from elected officials in Morocco to the MSP to civil society groups from the Tindouf camps – all of whom might have more political flexibility to put ideas on the table than Morocco and the Polisario. These Sahrawis could contribute their ideas on specific issues such as elections, natural resource management and refugee reintegration – as well as on the sovereignty-related endgame issues.
For its part, the Polisario should engage more earnestly in the process. Whatever the Front thinks of the Trump administration’s pressure campaign, both the Polisario and Sahrawi refugees would benefit from seeing it defused. Showing some flexibility would have the dual advantage of helping stave off this threat while taking advantage of U.S. engagement to advance diplomacy. For example, the Polisario could present a new proposal based on a 2003 plan advanced by James Baker, the former U.S. secretary of state who was then UN envoy. Under that plan, which combined autonomy and self-determination, Western Sahara would have had five years of substantial self-rule, with an elected local executive and legislature, while Morocco would have retained responsibility for foreign affairs and defence. After that transitional period, the UN would have held a referendum on the territory’s final status. At the time, the Front accepted the plan, while Rabat rejected it. Such a counteroffer would at least provide the co-chairs with a document they could use in trying to bridge the gap between the two sides’ positions.
Morocco should also find ways to show flexibility. While one concrete way to do that might be releases of Gdeim Izik prisoners, it will also need to set something of a different tone in negotiations, resisting the temptation to treat autonomy as an outcome that can be fast-tracked. A more durable settlement will require Rabat to accept a long, difficult negotiating process in which trust gradually is rebuilt and the terms of any eventual compromise are worked through with the Polisario, rather than presented as a fait accompli.
Meanwhile, the UN Security Council should refrain from sunsetting MINURSO and ensure that any effort to streamline its mandate or reform the mission preserves its military monitoring component to manage the risk that fighting will spill into Algerian or Mauritanian territory. Washington may reasonably seek to review the mission’s costs and functions, but reforms that significantly weaken or eliminate this military role could remove one of the few remaining stabilising mechanisms in Western Sahara.
Finally, Washington should maintain a balanced approach to regional diplomacy – engaging regularly with both Algeria and Morocco, as it has sought to do during the current diplomatic effort, rather than allowing its closer ties with Rabat to feed perceptions that it is taking sides in an increasingly polarised regional competition. Maintaining credible channels with both capitals could help contain bilateral tensions, limit the Western Sahara dispute’s entanglement in wider rivalries and protect the political space needed for an eventual negotiated settlement. Should U.S. diplomats instead choose to intensify pressure on the Polisario and its backers in hopes of forcing rapid acceptance of Morocco’s autonomy framework, they are likely to find – potentially at high cost to the parties and to the region – that a conflict more than five decades old is unlikely to be resolved through coercion alone.