What is happening?
Niger’s military leadership continues to reel from a coup attempt that exposed serious divides within the defence and security forces. On 28-29 August, soldiers from Niger’s Special Forces began shooting in their barracks at Air Base 101, which lies within the compound of Niamey’s international airport and houses most of the country’s military aircraft, as well as army units and foreign troops. Unrest quickly spread: groups of soldiers attacked the state broadcaster and the presidential palace, both in the city centre. Whether the incident began as a mutiny or whether it was meant from the start to oust General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in a July 2023 coup, remains unclear. But the ramification of an uprising by a group of well-trained soldiers unhappy with their conditions of service and recent battlefield setbacks could be significant – particularly if it deepens divisions within the armed forces and disrupts their operations at a time when jihadist threats are looming large across several parts of the country.
Members of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion for Special Operations Command, known by the French acronym BSR-COS, appear to have been behind the coup attempt, although a small number of soldiers from other units may have joined. Loyalist forces, particularly the presidential guard that Tiani commanded from 2011 to 2023, fought back as gunfire and detonations shook the capital, while national radio and television temporarily stopped broadcasting. By midday on 29 August, the mutineers withdrew to Air Base 101, where they unsuccessfully sought to rally other units to join them in toppling the government. Their stand did not last long, however. By the evening, national TV was up and running again, broadcasting images of loyalist forces arresting dozens, including at least one female soldier. A few days later, the government organised a national funeral for three members of the presidential guard forces who died in the clashes, while media reported that at least 27 mutineers were killed. The clashes further unsettled civilians in the capital, where heavy gunfire and explosions had already jolted residents twice this year, in January and June, when jihadists attacked the international airport, leaving many increasingly anxious about their safety.
Why did the soldiers rebel?
Tensions had been building within the BSR-COS for some time. In the days leading up to the revolt some soldiers had reportedly refused to go on a mission, citing a lack of adequate equipment. The battalion’s commander, Major Boubacar Maïhatchi, was detained soon after in the town of Tera as he returned from a mission escorting supply trucks from neighbouring Burkina Faso. Social media platforms have portrayed Maïhatchi as popular among younger officers, who respect his bravery and concern for his troops. His arrest may have prompted the soldiers’ decision to turn against the military leadership.
The BSR-COS is part of Niger’s elite special forces, trained and equipped to work specifically in high-danger zones. As jihadist violence intensified in western Niger starting in the mid-2010s, the government expanded these forces, creating additional battalions, often with training and equipment from Western partners such as the U.S., France, and Germany. Today, there are more than a dozen battalions of roughly 500 to 600 soldiers each. The BSR-COS is among the most recently established units, with its members receiving training in Morocco.
These battalions are leading the fight against jihadist insurgencies in Niger, including Islamic State Sahel Province and Jama’ at Nusratul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in the west. From its headquarters at Air Base 101, the BSR-COS has frequently assisted units under attack from jihadists or escorted convoys travelling through dangerous areas. In November 2025, for instance, Niger sent 82 fuel tankers to Mali to ease shortages caused by a JNIM blockade on the city. Members of the battalion led the military escort that protected the vehicles during the 1,400 km journey.
While special forces battalions are valuable to the fight against jihadists, they are also capable of posing a serious threat to the military regime. Since winning independence from France in 1960, Niger has experienced five coups and several failed coup attempts. The army has long held sway in politics. Seven of its eleven presidents have been military officers. Given that history, Niger’s leaders are understandably wary of powerful military units.
Where to deploy the special forces often presents the authorities with a dilemma. As the jihadist threat draws closer to the capital, their presence is increasingly indispensable to protect strategic localities and sites. At the same time, their proximity to the seat of power also fuels concerns within the military regime about the risk of yet another coup. The BSR-COS was initially expected to deploy to Ayorou, a jihadist hotspot near the Malian border where the government is building a large dam crucial for electricity and irrigation. That deployment was delayed in part because of militant attacks on Air Base 101 in January and again in June 2026.
Why are soldiers unhappy with Niger’s top military leaders?
The incident revealed a widening gap between the military leadership and the rank and file. The July 2023 coup brought senior officers from various components of the defence and security forces to power, ranging from the presidential guard and the army to the gendarmerie and the national guard. Together, these senior figures formed the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland, which shapes government policy and military strategy. Four generals wielded the most influence in the council: Abdourahmane Tiani, who had himself sworn in for a five-year presidential term in 2025; Defence Minister Salifou Mody, his second-in-command; Mohamed Toumba, who heads the interior and security ministry; and armed forces chief of staff Moussa Salao Barmou, who has since been removed.
Yet beneath the military brass that had seized control of the country, discontent has been simmering in the lower ranks. The senior officers justified their power grab partly by accusing the civilian government they toppled of failing to tackle the jihadist threat. Three years on, insecurity has grown and spread to more parts of the country; the opening of new fronts has stretched the defence and security forces thin. Troops are deployed to the front line more frequently and remain there longer. Foot soldiers complain that they lack adequate weapons and equipment. They allege air or ground reinforcements are slow to arrive when needed, if they arrive at all. Combat vehicles and pickup trucks are often in poor shape and the government has been slow to replace them, which makes working in high-risk zones hazardous. Conditions in military barracks have added to soldiers’ frustrations. Some have posted images on social media of the poor-quality meals they are served; others pool their money and buy condiments to improve their rations. On top of that, a recent wave of jihadist attacks – in Diffa, Dosso, Tillabery and Niamey – has killed dozens, draining troop morale.
Senior command seems aware of the rumblings. The defence minister, the chief of army staff and other generals have made multiple visits to military bases to listen to soldiers’ concerns. They often blame sanctions imposed by foreign powers after the July 2023 coup for hampering their ability to procure arms. Most of these sanctions have since been lifted, however, and many soldiers appear unconvinced by the senior leadership’s explanation for the lack of equipment. In several instances soldiers’ frustration has manifested in defiance. The August revolt was Niger’s fourth episode of military unrest in less than two years. In June 2025, after an attack in Banibangou in northern Tillabery killed over 70 military personnel, soldiers assigned to retake the position protested and beat the officer in charge, who was later evacuated for medical treatment. A few days later, soldiers in the Zinder region mutinied and tried to kill their superior. In August 2025, soldiers in Ayorou rebelled and opened fire on their commander. As one officer puts it, “A mutiny is first and foremost a failure of leadership”.
What did the coup attempt and its aftermath reveal about military divisions?
The incident broke an unwritten rule that has long guided Niger’s military: namely, it is essential to avoid internal confrontations between different branches of the armed forces. In 2023, various military units opposed Tiani’s move to detain then-President Mohamed Bazoum in order to remove him from office, but senior commanders ultimately decided to avert an open conflict and rally behind Tiani’s power grab. This time around, the mutineers fought the presidential guard, while the government asked Russia’s Africa Corps to help quell the revolt. Hours after the August revolt had subsided, Russia’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropayev, told reporters that Russian forces had helped subdue the dissidents. Around 200 men from Africa Corps, the expeditionary force controlled by Russia’s defence ministry, have been deployed in Niger, including at Air Base 101, since 2024. They have assisted the regime with intelligence gathering, training on drone use, and operating air-defence systems. Russian forces reportedly used kamikaze drones that explode upon impact to force the mutineers to surrender.
Some within the military found the involvement of foreigners in an internal confrontation particularly grating. Rumours have it that armed forces chief of staff Barmou may have been among those who voiced reservations about the Africa Corps’ intervention against the mutineers. In any event, on 11 September Tiani replaced Barmou with General Mamane Sani Kiaou, a move observers interpreted as aimed at reasserting control over the army. Barmou was also among the first generation of Nigerien special forces officers trained by the U.S. in the 2000s; he had reportedly threatened to resign previously over the army’s lack of equipment and his limited influence over military decision-making. Regime authorities, meanwhile, arrested over a hundred soldiers, while dozens of others, including special forces members, remain unaccounted for. Several civilians were also arrested, including two former ministers and a prominent journalist.
The coup attempt could accentuate the resentment many troops feel vis-à-vis the presidential guard. The elite unit has long had access to the best equipment and the most talented recruits. It also foiled several coup attempts in the 2010s and early 2020s, leading some in the armed forces to perceive the guard as preoccupied with policing the military and protecting the regime rather than national security.
Finally, the failed coup demonstrated that public support for the military regime is declining. The generals’ promises to restore security, overhaul governance, and assert Niger’s sovereignty on the international stage won a degree of sympathy from the public early on. But much of that enthusiasm has evaporated amid repeated security setbacks and an economic slowdown, partly attributable to the departure of Western donors and the closing of many NGOs by the government. On the afternoon of the coup attempt, regime supporters called on Niamey residents to turn out in support of the military leadership; notably, only a few dozen people did so.
How did the incident reverberate in the region?
The unrest had major diplomatic repercussions. The following day, a Nigerien officer speaking on national television alleged that he had received calls and messages from contacts in Chad, France, Belgium and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), informing him that several foreign countries – including Chad, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and France – were prepared to intervene in support of those who had seized Air Base 101. He said they were operating with the blessing of the Economic Community of West Africa, the regional bloc from which Niger – alongside Burkina Faso and Mali – withdrew in 2025. On 3 September, the government spokesperson accused France of orchestrating the mutiny and alleged that “other African countries” had supported Paris.
Some of these accusations were unsurprising. Tiani has repeatedly accused Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and France of conspiring against him, allegations the countries have rejected. But the regime’s claims that Chad was somehow also intent on destabilising Niger were new. Niger’s relations with Chad have soured in recent months. Niger’s authorities and their counterparts in Chad have traded accusations of tolerating, or even supporting, armed opposition groups active in their common border zones. Chadian officials did not respond to the allegations, although President Mahamat Idriss Déby later posted Quranic verse on social media warning against mixing truth with falsehoods.
At the same time, the failed coup brought northern neighbour Algeria closer to the Nigerien authorities. Algeria condemned the incident and sent its chief of army staff to Niamey along with four fighter jets and a refuelling aircraft. The deployment of the fighter jets was apparently aimed at sending a strong message of support and to deter any attempt by foreign interests to dislodge the regime. The gesture also reinforced a diplomatic thaw already under way between the two countries. Relations had deteriorated last year after Algeria shot down a Malian drone near its border, prompting Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – the three members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – to recall their ambassadors from Algiers. Niger and Algeria have since taken several steps toward rapprochement, culminating in President Tiani’s visit to Algiers in February.
The episode has also reinforced Niger’s relationship with Russia. Moscow’s intervention demonstrated the growing importance of Russian security support to the authorities in Niamey. In turn, the episode could deepen the regime’s dependence on Moscow for its survival. Since the coup, most Western forces have left Niger, including U.S. and French troops, as well as German, Belgian and Canadian personnel involved in training the Nigerien armed forces. Today, only a few hundred Italian troops remain, making Italy the last Western country with a military presence in Niger.
What should the authorities do next?
The Nigerien authorities should exercise restraint during their ongoing post-coup crackdown. While those within the BSR-COS who instigated the mutiny will likely face sanctions, the authorities should spare the rank and file who simply followed commanders’ orders. Thus far, over a hundred soldiers have been arrested. A sweeping purge risks further weakening the armed forces, deepening mistrust between ranks and damaging troop morale at a time when Niger is under enormous pressure from jihadists and rebel groups.
Restraint will not address the grievances that helped fuel the revolt, however. The authorities should tackle soldiers’ concerns about inadequate equipment, housing and food. A leaked 2020 defence audit exposed widespread corruption in procurement practices. In February 2024, however, Niger’s military authorities issued an ordinance exempting defence and security procurement from ordinary state contracting and public accounting oversight. Without compromising legitimate security concerns, the authorities could adopt a stronger approach to rooting out wrongdoing in the acquisition of military equipment, as well as improve living conditions in the barracks.
The authorities should also tread carefully in order not to deepen divisions between different wings of the defence and security forces. Even symbolic decisions matter. The national funeral held for three presidential guard soldiers reinforced perceptions of double standards: regular soldiers who are killed in the line of duty are often buried quietly and rarely honoured publicly. A more equitable recognition of soldiers’ sacrifices could help reduce resentment across the ranks.
More fundamentally, Niamey needs to reduce the mounting burden on its armed forces. The authorities should develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the proliferation of conflict fronts, giving greater weight to non-military approaches. Where possible, dialogue and diplomacy could help pacify restive areas. Even if such approaches do not produce sustainable peace, they could help demobilise combatants, achieve temporary ceasefires, and possibly reduce the number of simultaneous conflicts, providing relief to armed forces that show growing signs of fatigue.
Finally, the authorities should recognise that military discontent is unfolding in an increasingly closed political environment. With political parties dissolved and civic space severely restricted, peaceful avenues for expressing dissatisfaction with the government have narrowed considerably. In such an environment, the armed forces risk becoming one of the few remaining channels through which opposition to the regime can erupt, and potentially in its most dangerous form. Reopening political and civic space would allow grievances to be expressed through less destabilising channels, even if doing so exposes the authorities to greater public criticism.