The Myanmar military carried out one of its deadliest airstrikes against civilians on 28 September, hitting a busy market and bridge in Kyauktaw, a town in Rakhine State administered by the Arakan Army, a predominantly Rakhine Buddhist armed group that now controls much of the state. Local reports put the death toll at 50 people, with another 58 wounded. Military airstrikes have continued in the region since then, including attacks on two camps for internally displaced people that left eight civilians dead.
Military targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure is hardly new. The UN documented 982 civilian deaths from military airstrikes last year, and Rakhine has been among the hardest hit regions. Since the 2021 military coup, Naypyitaw has increasingly used airpower to punish communities in areas it does not control and destroy its opponents’ ability to govern effectively. This latest bombing campaign comes as a multi-front military counteroffensive in Rakhine appears to have stalled. On 4 September, the military began ground operations from its main remaining footholds in the state – the capital, Sittwe, and Kyaukphyu, home to Chinese infrastructure projects – while simultaneously attempting to push into Rakhine from the east, across the mountains from central Myanmar. Despite deploying drones, artillery, aircraft and gunboats, the attacks have made little headway.
Recent peace overtures make the military’s escalation in Rakhine appear somewhat incongruous. After the military-controlled parliament appointed Min Aung Hlaing president in April, his administration invited ethnic armed groups for peace talks “without preconditions”. Several groups have since met his negotiators, but the Arakan Army has not been one of them.
Although a tactical ceasefire would benefit both sides – removing one of the military’s most formidable opponents from the battlefield, while bringing relief to the armed group after years of intense fighting and an economic blockade – the two remain far apart on what a deal might look like. A truce along existing front lines would require Naypyitaw to acknowledge the loss of around 90 per cent of Rakhine State – a humiliating outcome for a military that firmly controlled the state under a decade ago. Even as a temporary arrangement, military leaders would fear such a deal could solidify into a permanent autonomous enclave. To make a deal acceptable to Naypyitaw, the Arakan Army would have to cede some of its current territory, which it would be loath to do.
Had its recent offensive made major inroads, the military might have created impetus for a ceasefire: Naypyitaw would have avoided total capitulation, while the Arakan Army would have had a stronger incentive to freeze a front line preserving most of its gains. The failure of the campaign has instead left them deadlocked, and the violence unleashed over the past month, particularly the bombardment at Kyauktaw, are indicative of the military’s frustration. With a deal now even less likely, the most likely scenario in the near term is a war of attrition in which civilians bear the heaviest cost, deepening an already severe humanitarian crisis.