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Executive Summary
Discussion of the so-called “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia has driven significant coverage from the perspective of U.S. national defense strategy in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theaters. But as the United States moves to shore up its presence in the Western Hemisphere, it is worth considering the extent to which China and Russia may be coordinating their moves in the media, security, and economic domains in the region. For this reason, the CSIS Americas Program has designed a series of novel tabletop exercises (TTXs) to better understand the consequences of China-Russia cooperation across a range of sectors.
The findings from this latest exercise examine the economic and trade space. While China enjoys far greater economic clout in the region, Russia has been adept at leveraging its more limited presence to nevertheless wield substantial influence. Results from the exercise suggest that when China and Russia cooperate, they tend to pursue more coercive trade and economic measures. However, this same coercion tends to backfire in the region, a lesson that may also carry implications for how the United States calculates its own approach.
To address the challenges of rising Chinese and Russian economic coercion in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the United States must leverage the current spate of U.S.-aligned governments in the region to build new architectures for economic and trade security, focus on creating enabling conditions for private sector investment, and prioritize competition in critical infrastructure, particularly ports, energy, digital communications, and artificial intelligence.
Background and Strategic Context
The ongoing U.S.-Iran war has concretized fears over an emergent alliance between China, Russia, and Iran. Chinese satellites have reportedly helped map U.S. basing infrastructure in the Persian Gulf ahead of deadly missile and drone strikes, while the integration of the Russian and Iranian defense industrial bases, previously done to the sole benefit of Moscow, is now aiding Tehran’s efforts to replenish its munitions stockpiles. This cooperation is in many ways opportunistic rather than strategic. Nevertheless, it suggests that rumors of the demise of the so-called “axis of authoritarians”—following the failure of Moscow and Beijing to react to the removal of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro—were exaggerated. It also underscores how unforeseen cooperation between like-minded geopolitical rivals poses a serious risk to U.S. national security.
While these threats appear most acutely within the security domain, this is hardly the only area where China and Russia have sought to strengthen collaboration. In the trade and economic space, efforts by the two countries to control critical supply chains, apply pressure to U.S. allies, and coordinate sanctions evasion for themselves as well as their fellow autocratic hangers-on, all represent important considerations the United States must account for in conceptualizing any emergent China-Russia “no-limits” partnership. For this reason, CSIS conducted a series of TTXs in 2025 and 2026 to better understand various facets of the China-Russia partnership and how coordination across a range of sectors, including economic, may or may not prejudice U.S. interests in the region. Findings from the previous two TTXs suggest that the strength of this cooperation varies significantly depending on the sector. In the economic and trade space, there may be potential for cooperation in some industries, but China and Russia could find themselves at odds in others.
The economic dimension certainly contains the most widespread array of interests for the two powers. It is also where China far outpaces Russia in terms of both the breadth and depth of engagement. For most countries in the region, China is the number one or number two trade partner, as well as one of the largest sources of development finance and foreign direct investment. As a result, China exerts a powerful gravitational pull through its economic presence in the region. Russia, for its part, has carved out a niche in the fuel and fertilizer markets and in some cases has been able to effectively leverage its lighter trade footprint for political advantage. Ecuador, for instance, appeared on the verge of supplying legacy Russian and Soviet weapons to Ukraine (via the United States), when Russian sanctions and enhanced phytosanitary checks on the country’s banana industry forced President Daniel Noboa to walk back the plan. The incident underscored the role of media and information influence when paired with economic pressure, as both RT and Sputnik raced to amplify statements by the Russian foreign ministry that providing arms to Ukraine, however indirectly, would make Ecuador and its people belligerents in the ongoing war. It also serves as a troubling portent of the kinds of influence China could wield should it pursue coercive economic measures against the region.
Furthermore, both China and Russia have pursued convergent investment projects targeting Bolivia’s critical minerals sector. Former Bolivian President Luis Arce signed agreements with Chinese battery maker CATL and Russia’s Uranium One Group to develop the country’s sizeable lithium reserves in conjunction with Bolivia’s state-owned mining company. However, this proposed project drew protests and civil society opposition. Meanwhile, the election of Rodrigo Paz Pereira in 2025 has brought about a reorientation toward the United States with respect to Bolivia’s international cooperation priorities.
Another area ripe for China-Russia cooperation in LAC concerns sanctions evasion. A combination of Russian maintenance and Chinese demand for energy was essential to keeping the Maduro regime afloat in Venezuela following U.S. sectoral sanctions against the oil industry. As Maduro sought to hang on to power following a brazen election theft, the importance of China and Russia as economic lifelines grew, though in the aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve, Chinese and Russian economic influence seems to have dissipated significantly in Venezuela. However diminished, Chinese and Russian influence in Venezuela has not disappeared entirely, and both countries can play spoiler roles as Caracas looks to renegotiate its massive external public debt. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the authoritarian Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua continues to strengthen its partnerships with China and Russia, including granting Chinese mining companies control over vast swathes of its territory.
Beijing and Moscow have also championed de-dollarization as a means of reducing their exposure to U.S. sanctions architecture. China, in particular, has provided billions of dollars in currency swap lines to Argentina and is pushing for more of its trade with LAC to be denominated in yuan. Not only have China and Russia provided an economic lifeline to authoritarian allies in the Americas, but both have benefited from relatively unfettered trade with LAC countries as the United States and Europe raise new trade barriers. In the wake of U.S. and European sanctions on Russian oil and gas, the Kremlin stepped up its exports of diesel to countries including Brazil, which is now the largest importer in the world and has consistently opposed all sanctions regimes not explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council. Latin America’s natural resource wealth is also increasingly important to sustain Russia’s war economy—and potentially, a future wartime China.
Exercise Design and Methodology
To test the implications of China-Russia collaboration in LAC’s media and information environment, the CSIS research team developed a unique TTX, which was conducted over the course of two iterations and featured a total of 20 participants, representing former government officials, think tank experts, and academics. This was the third in a series of custom TTX scenarios developed by the Americas Program as part of this research project.
The exercise is set in January 2027, when a spate of elections throughout Latin America have brought to power a new cohort of leaders throughout the Americas. While these governments are of differing backgrounds and political stripes, they all share a desire to align more closely with the United States. In the scenario, encouraged by Argentine President Javier Milei, who is heading toward a reelection contest, they have decided that one way to signal this closer alignment with the United States is by breaking with the region’s trend of neutrality over the Russia-Ukraine war. The war is dragging into a seemingly interminable quagmire as it races toward the fifth year of full-intensity conflict. While the situation along the front lines remains a bloody contest of attrition, Moscow is increasingly feeling the sting of international sanctions and sky-high inflation that risks unwinding the war economy it has managed to sustain in an uneasy stasis thus far. A concerted effort by a major bloc of countries to join the U.S.-led sanctions campaign could push Russia’s already strained war economy toward total collapse and even incentivize other Global South countries to join in the effort.
Under this scenario, Russia has condemned the efforts of Argentina as needlessly escalatory. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has warned that if the coalition of countries pursues sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin will respond in kind with economic pressure on strategic sectors. Moscow almost assuredly hopes to be able to replicate this success or at least to peel away some members of the bloc in order to undermine the appearance of a unified front. China, meanwhile, is watching the developments with considerable interest. Beijing wishes to downplay its stake in the matter, but Foreign Minister Wang Yi has expressed that China cannot allow Russia to lose its war in Ukraine.
China is also worried that the emergence of this bloc could signal a shift away from the region’s previous nonaligned stance, with implications for a potential Taiwan contingency. If agricultural powerhouses such as Argentina and Brazil or critical minerals suppliers such as Chile are willing to halt exports to China in a future conflict scenario, China could find itself facing unexpected supply chain disruptions. More proximately, a summit of the presidents of Chile, Colombia, and Brazil to be held in Buenos Aires and whatever declaration might emerge in its aftermath could present an opportunity for the United States to minimize China’s influence in South American affairs—a strategic setback, especially given the billions that China has poured into cultivating goodwill in the region.
The United States, for its part, welcomes the shift among regional governments and has issued a number of diplomatic statements expressing support for the moves. Washington is willing to help offset some of the economic pressure that Moscow, and potentially Beijing, could bring to bear on countries that join in sanctioning the former, but privately it hopes it will not come to that. The United States also hopes that the nascent South American alliance could put further pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to the peace deal it has been trying to forge unsuccessfully for years. However, years of back-and-forth tariffs, as well as threats of tariffs, mean that the U.S. geoeconomic tool kit may be better calibrated for punishment than reward. The United States still recognizes the strategic opportunity the present moment offers and how this may dovetail with the Americas-first foreign policy it has increasingly adopted.
With this panorama in mind, the key test of the scenario envisions a summit of Latin American leaders where they are expected to sign a joint declaration of intent on the Russia-Ukraine war. The language of the declaration (see Appendix B) will be put to a vote, but beforehand there will be opportunities for members of the grouping to try and amend it. This also serves as a lightning rod for interest from Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, who are all hoping to sway the terms to their benefit or prevent the declaration from being signed in the first place. To do so, all three countries are ransacking their economic tool kits for the appropriate combination of carrots and sticks.
Each iteration of the TTX took place across five phases. As in previous exercises, players began by reviewing their objectives and discussing strategy for the turn. The United States, China, and Russia teams all had menus of actions they could take, divided between coercive and incentive actions they could offer to any number of regional governments. These teams were constrained in the number of activities they could take by a budget representing each country’s respective influence and strength in the economic space.
The regional governments all acted as representatives of their country but met together as a single “team.” Their objective in both games was to vote on whether to accept, amend, or reject the proposed resolution expressing solidarity with Ukraine. The goal of each country was also to minimize the number of coercive actions they are subject to and maximize the number of cooperative activities they receive.
To this end, regional governments had the opportunity to meet with the United States, China, and Russia teams individually. Following the first meeting, the United States, China, and Russia teams each had the opportunity to spend part of their budget on incentive or coercive activities targeted at one or more of the four regional governments in order to demonstrate credibility and potentially compel these actors toward a preferred policy position. After this initial set of moves, there was another round of negotiations by regional governments, followed by a final vote on the text of the draft resolution. After the resolution was shared in its final form, the United States, China, and Russia teams each had the opportunity to spend the remainder of their activity budget on either punishing or rewarding the regional governments for their decisions.
After players completed both turns of the first iteration, they restarted the exercise using the same teams. The gameplay was identical, except that in the second iteration, the China and Russia teams were allowed (though not required) to coordinate their decisionmaking.
Limitations and Caveats
While the exercise sought to cleave to real-world conditions as closely as possible, it necessarily fell short in some dimensions. The inclusion of just four regional governments may have limited the dynamism that would characterize a real-world summit of this sort. Even the Summit of the Americas drew a dozen regional leaders, and it seems probable that more than just Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia would attend a gathering like the one described. Nevertheless, based on participants’ observations during the exercise and testimony during the debrief, there was sufficient interplay between different regional perspectives during the exercise that the findings are still valid.
Further, the game design may have ascribed too much flexibility to the U.S. player in terms of economic policy. In reality, China is often more agile than the United States due to its high degree of state control over the economy. While this may be true, LAC is but one region of many where China has economic interests. Because the region is harder for it to access, China might allocate fewer resources to LAC despite having more economic clout overall at its disposal.
Latin American participants were also unable to take actions unilaterally, except in the drafting of the final resolution. In reality, the four countries may have sought to cooperate among themselves to lessen some of the economic blows from coercive actions by the great powers. Future iterations of this exercise might consider including some unilateral actions for regional players to consider.
Finally, while players were given menus of enumerated incentive and coercive activities, they were also allowed to develop their own, with points costs determined by the CSIS moderators in order to provide greater flexibility in gameplay. Players across both iterations made extensive use option to craft custom strategies. While this is not necessarily a flaw, it could indicate that the more specific activities enumerated were not sufficiently expansive to encompass the full spectrum of economic maneuvering.
Key Findings
Over the course of the two game iterations, the CSIS research team documented internal team discussions and the specific actions these groups decided upon. The following section outlines some of the major takeaways from this analysis.
- Democracies respond poorly to coercion.
In the first iteration of the game, China sought to apply economic pressure to convince countries to strike sections from the draft resolution. This strategy ultimately proved ineffective as countries felt alienated by the pressure and instead turned to the United States for support. Ultimately, China was unsuccessful at compelling countries to redact key provisions of the resolution pertaining to the provision of support for Ukraine and support for sanctions on Russia, which China viewed as potentially setting harmful precedents for its own behavior in the Indo-Pacific.
In the second iteration, both China and Russia pursued more maximalist demands, prompting LAC countries to rebel even more and refuse to retract most of the clauses in the draft resolution. This outcome is consistent with historical success rates for Chinese economic coercion, as retaliation has often failed to cause these countries to reverse their policies and in many cases has weakened China’s hand. For instance, when China cut off rare earth exports to Japan in 2010 over a maritime dispute, Japan responded by building out alternative mineral suppliers.
This finding may also carry lessons for the United States and its own conduct in LAC. The Donald Trump administration has been quick to reach for trade-based responses to policy disputes, threatening high tariffs on Colombia in 2025 over then-President Gustavo Petro’s refusal to accept deportation flights. In this case, the United States was able to achieve its objective, and Colombia backed down from its defiant position. However, the Trump administration’s use of tariffs against Brazil has prompted defiance from the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, which has refused to entertain concessions. This suggests that trade-based coercion, in particular, may be a depreciating asset that is most effective the first time it is deployed but loses heft over time as countries diversify their economic partnerships and insulate themselves from the coercive state.
- China was the most coercive.
In both iterations of the game, China proved the most willing to employ coercive economic measures against LAC countries. This was somewhat counterintuitive, as Russia often acted as a spoiler in previous simulations focused on the media and security domains. However, Russia in the first iteration of the game proved willing to settle for a slight watering down of the statement, whereas China pushed more maximalist demands. Russian ambivalence was likely the product of the country’s more limited resources and recognition that a more hostile political environment in LAC did not fundamentally compromise its ability to continue prosecuting the war in Ukraine. By contrast, China, with its greater resources, was more willing to throw its weight around. This is borne out in the empirical record with China’s retaliation against Panama following the latter country’s Supreme Court decision to cancel the port leases held by CK Hutchison.
When Russia and China were allowed to cooperate, both were emboldened to pursue a harder line on the language of the resolution. Russia, in particular, employed more coercive actions during the second iteration of the exercise, feeling as though it could count on China’s superior economic might to backstop these efforts. However, such a shift in strategy may have worked to the detriment of both powers, as noted in the first finding.
- Brazil sought to play the role of mediator.
Even when told to assume the role of a more U.S.-aligned government, Brazil sought to pursue a middle course between the United States, China, and Russia. Despite playing the role of a nominal supporter of Ukraine, Brazil early on opposed the resolution’s language ascribing “primary responsibility” to Russia for the war. Brazil, furthermore, sought to modify language committing the signatories to provide in-kind support for Ukraine, concerned that such assistance might make itself or other LAC countries parties to the conflict. These positions are largely in line with an established pattern in Brazilian foreign policy, which seeks to maintain independence between competing geopolitical poles. On top of this, even when governed by more right-wing or pro-U.S. administrations, Brazil’s trade relationship, especially with China, exerts a force all its own, which likely also shaped the team’s strategy in both games. This may have redounded to Brazil’s benefit: Over the course of the game, no team applied coercive pressure against Brazil. However, Brazil did receive a lower proportion of incentive actions from the United States.
- The United States supported LAC, but not unconditionally.
Throughout both games, the United States was more interested in displacing Chinese and Russian economic influence than it was in ensuring the original statement was adopted as intended. Washington generally viewed the summit as an opportunity to leverage partnerships with its new regional allies rather than ensure the absolute best terminology for Kyiv in the draft statement. This certainly appears consistent with the Trump administration’s rhetoric on Ukraine, which has oscillated considerably but tends to center on the goal of reducing the United States’ role and shifting responsibility principally to European allies. The United States still suffered from something of a mismatch in tools and desired ends: Whereas Russia and China were willing to cooperate in the infrastructure and industrial space, the United States mainly focused on tariff threats and credit lines.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The findings of this exercise indicate several actionable recommendations for U.S. engagement in LAC:
- Leverage regional alignment. LAC is being pulled into U.S. orbit. Several recent elections have brought to power presidents interested in reducing their countries’ ties to Beijing and Moscow and aligning with Washington. The United States should endeavor to help these countries in their goals, especially by developing plans to insulate partner countries from economic retaliation from China and Russia. While the Shield of the Americas grouping has thus far focused primarily on security sector cooperation, the recent joint statement issued by its members on the sidelines of the 2026 UN General Assembly offers a useful starting point with its commitment to “defend our economies by enhancing economic cooperation; exploring investment screening mechanisms; safeguarding critical minerals supply chains through diversified and reliable sourcing; and promoting trusted supplier regulations for digital infrastructure.” The United States can seize on this momentum to provide technical training and support for countries seeking to develop their own investment screening mechanisms to mitigate potentially problematic Chinese or Russian investments in regional critical infrastructure.
- Enable with the public sector, lead with the private sector. U.S. capital markets remain Washington’s greatest economic tool. While Washington cannot always compete with the same degree of precision, selecting individual companies to bid on specific projects, it can create the conditions for new investment flows. Recent public-private coordination in the critical minerals sector helps illustrate one potential template for future investments. For example, in Brazil, home to the world’s second-largest reserves of rare earth elements (REEs) outside of China, USA Rare Earth—with support from the Pentagon and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)—concluded a landmark minerals agreement in April 2026. The deal, inked together with Brazilian REE producer Serra Verde, involved a 15-year guaranteed offtake agreement, a key step in building an alternative to the current China-dominated supply chain for critical rare earths. LAC’s growing relevance to global mineral and energy resources means scaling this playbook is of significant strategic value for the United States.
- Prioritize critical infrastructure. Competition on critical infrastructure remains the United States’ greatest weakness and China’s comparative advantage. While investment screening may help reduce countries’ vulnerability to entering lopsided deals, it is no substitute for a genuine counteroffer from the United States and its allies. Agencies such the DFC remain critical to contesting Chinese influence in ports, power, and telecommunications. The September 2026 announcement that the DFC and the Export-Import Bank of the United States will be supporting the Andes-Atlantic Corridor, aimed at connecting Argentina’s Vaca Muerte shale gas fields to coastal export terminals, provides another useful template for future projects. However, in some cases, the United States may need to enlist additional allies from the Indo-Pacific and Europe to serve as trusted partners on critical infrastructure in LAC.
Henry Ziemer is a fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
This report is made possible through the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.
Please see the PDF for the appendices