A September advance by the Iran-backed Houthi movement (Ansarallah) down the Red Sea coast has expanded the Yemen conflict, drawing several outside actors into the fighting. The Houthi seizure of territory astride the key Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which nearly 10 percent of global trade passes, elevated the global significance of the Yemen conflict. The combat in Yemen has amplified the economic effects of the U.S.-Iran battle for control of the Strait of Hormuz, the passageway to the Persian Gulf, complicating the strategic challenge facing U.S. and regional officials. President Trump has thus far delegated to Saudi Arabia the responsibility to contain the Houthis, but the escalating crisis has led him and other Saudi partners, including the UAE, Türkiye, Pakistan, and others, to reconsider initial decisions not to intervene directly on Saudi Arabia’s behalf.
The Houthi seizure of territory at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is adding to pre-existing tensions on the west side of the Red Sea fueled by the war between the government of Ethiopia and rebels from Tigray and neighboring provinces. Addis Ababa’s war against the Tigray rebels is not directly related to the fighting in Yemen, but the two conflicts have generated spillover effects on each other, including disruptions to the flow of humanitarian aid and refugee movements across the Red Sea. Many countries in Africa, including landlocked Ethiopia, depend on imports that flow through Red Sea ports, such as those in Eritrea and Djibouti. Last week, the fighting in Ethiopia expanded to include combat against Eritrean forces that Addis Ababa accuses of helping the rebellion.
On the eastern side of the Red Sea, the renewed Yemen conflict continues to escalate as Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launch counteroffensive operations to try to push Houthi forces back from the southern Red Sea coastal positions they captured last month. The ground war resumed over the summer when the Houthis escalated militarily to try to break a decade-long Saudi blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and airfields. The Houthi escalation also appeared intended to help Iran in its struggle against the U.S. The Houthis are said to be close to enveloping the key city of Ta’iz in an attempt to capture it — a development that would significantly set back the Saudis and their Yemeni partners. On Saturday, the Houthis were responsible for a mass casualty event, launching a ballistic missile strike on passenger terminals at King Khaled Airport in Riyadh. The attack killed 12, including one American, and injured 300 civilians. The Houthis attacked the airport again on Sunday. On Thursday, three Saudi nationals, including a pilot, were killed in two Houthi attacks on that same airport, Saudi aviation authorities said. The airport strikes followed several days of Houthi strikes on Saudi Aramco energy infrastructure facilities.
Yet the Houthi ground advance and missile strikes have also pushed several Saudi allies closer to intervention in Yemen on the Kingdom’s behalf. During the Houthi offensive down the coast in September, President Trump spurned direct requests from the Saudi de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), to conduct air strikes on advancing Houthi units. Washington took the far more modest step of expanding the targeting intelligence it provides to the Saudis. However, on Saturday, asked whether the U.S. would retaliate for the Houthi strike on the major airport in Riyadh, Trump told journalists: “We may. We’re going to look at it. We just found out about the recent attack, so we’ll make a decision. We move very quickly.” Reports on Sunday suggested Trump is considering a joint U.S.-Saudi retaliatory attack against the Houthis.
Similarly, the Kingdom’s former partner against the Houthis, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has hesitated to re-engage in Yemen after the bruising 2015-2022 war that resulted in a tenuous ceasefire. Yet, Abu Dhabi assessed that the new Houthi gains in Yemen will embolden the Iran-backed group to renew attacks on the UAE as well, and it is reportedly directing some of the Yemeni units it has mentored to join the Saudi-commanded ground campaign against the Houthis. Still, the two Arab Gulf powers differ on which south Yemeni factions to favor, and the UAE considers MBS too willing to accept a compromise with the Houthis rather than battle them to a decisive conclusion.
Further complicating a renewed Saudi-UAE partnership in Yemen, Saudi Arabia remains critical of the UAE’s close cooperation with Israel and a host of other issues. Riyadh, along with several other Arab powers, sees Abu Dhabi as an outlier for, among other policies, its strategic alignment with the Ethiopian government and its military aid to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia fighting the Sudan Armed Forces for control of Sudan. Abu Dhabi’s policies have been intended, in large part, to fulfill UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ)’s long-held ambition to build preponderant influence on both sides of the Red Sea and deny Iran a foothold in eastern Africa.
However, MBZ’s strategy has put him at loggerheads not only with MBS but with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, who strongly supports the Sudan Armed Forces against the RSF. Last week, at their “Consultative Quadrilateral Summit” in New Alamein City, Egypt, Sisi, Sudan Armed Forces commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the leaders of Somalia and Eritrea issued a “Joint Alamein Declaration” supporting regional stability, territorial integrity, joint efforts against terrorist groups and violent non-state actors, and “Affirming the principle of freedom of navigation and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states.” The meeting, and its declaration, were indirect expressions of support for Burhan and an oblique criticism of the UAE. Last week, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed deepened tensions with Ethiopia’s neighbors, including those attending the Egypt meeting, by vowing that his landlocked country will work to secure a Red Sea outlet — presumably referring to Eritrea’s Assab Port. MBZ might support that Ethiopian plan, as it could help the UAE consolidate its influence on the west side of the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia has also reportedly consulted with another Arab state, Syria, which has only recently rejoined the Arab fold but is similarly committed to reducing Iranian influence in the region. Syrian troops participated in the rebellion against the Bashar al-Assad regime, which was backed by Iran and whose fall weakened the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region. However, Syria’s interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has not decided whether to send forces to Yemen. Among other considerations, adding Syrian troops to the Yemen battlefield will widen the appearance that the Yemen and Iran conflicts represent a broader Sunni-Shia schism.
Among non-Arab powers, Pakistan — long a close ally of the Kingdom — last month indicated it would not intervene in Yemen, despite signing a tripartite “Mecca Defense Agreement” in August committing Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia to mutual defense. Pakistan has been a key mediator in the U.S.-Iran war and might not want to jeopardize its influence with Iran by confronting Tehran’s ally in the Axis of Resistance. However, the latest Houthi gains appear to have prompted a reassessment in Islamabad. On Friday, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif said the country will stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the Kingdom to defend it, although its intervention will be “purely defensive.” A senior Pakistani military official confirmed to the New York Times last week that Pakistan’s warplanes are now participating in airstrikes on Houthi forces in Yemen. A second Pakistani official told the paper Islamabad’s strikes focus on Houthi missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) installations, adding Pakistan will not send ground forces to Yemen.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of Türkiye, the other party to the Mecca pact, stated Friday the trilateral agreement is “defensive in nature,” and Ankara would not conduct military operations in Yemen. Türkiye’s relations with Saudi Arabia had been troubled over a number of major issues, including the role of Islamist movements in the region, and only gradually improved to the point where Ankara could join the Kingdom in the binding Mecca defense pact. But Ankara likely assesses that intervening in Yemen against Iran’s ally, the Houthis, would jeopardize its cooperation with Tehran against Kurdish organizations in the region. Turkish leaders also apparently fear Iran might target Türkiye as an adversary in the broader regional battle. However, even if Türkiye joins the Saudi-led combat, it is unclear whether outside contributions of air strikes alone, without accompanying ground units, will shift the battle in favor of Saudi-backed Yemeni forces.
The post Outside Powers Respond to Instability in the Red Sea appeared first on The Soufan Center.